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• Accountability, transparency and communication in disasters
• Disaster risk management in the Philippines
• Online tools and platforms for accountability 
Key themes in this paper
Summary 
When Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in 2013, several national and local 
tools, platforms and mechanisms were put in place by government to support a 
coordinated response. For example two technical groups were intended to ensure 
that there was regular, two-way communication between affected communities 
and responders, thus increasing transparency and government accountability.
This research assesses these tools, platforms and mechanisms in terms of how 
well they supported, and continue to support, the accountability and transparency 
of government interventions during disaster responses in the Philippines. It 
also looks at the potential for enhancing and replicating them vertically – across 
different levels of government – and horizontally – across different agencies, 
sectors and institutions – in ways that ensure that the principles of accountability 
and transparency are observed during all disaster responses.
Many of these tools, platforms and mechanisms are web-based and accessible 
to the public. Combined, they created a system through which the various relief 
agencies involved in disaster responses can improve transparency, among both 
project implementers and affected communities. Our research found that these 
tools, platforms and mechanisms did increase the information provided to 
communities and receive feedback from them, but that monitoring and evaluation 
of the services being delivered to communities was not often taking place. 
It also found that the unexpected magnitude of recent typhoon events in the 
Philippines overwhelmed service delivery, particularly in local government units. 
Overall, emergency response mechanisms, and the governance of these, were 
chaotic. 
The research strongly recommends that the implementation of Republic Act 10121 
should clearly define what accountability to disaster-affected communities is, 
including concrete measures to ensure accountability at all levels, and outline 
the checks and balances that all humanitarian agencies and other actors need to 
implement when providing disaster relief.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The Philippines: a disaster-
prone country
Located in both the Pacific Ring of Fire1 and the 
typhoon belt of the Northwestern Pacific Basin, the 
Philippines is highly vulnerable to disasters caused 
by natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, tsunamis and typhoons. An average of 
20 typhoons reach the country each year, and the 
typhoons that reach the Philippines are becoming 
stronger and more devastating (World Bank GFDRR, 
UNDP and EU 2015). For example, Typhoon Bopha2 in 
2012 and Typhoon Haiyan3 in 2013 were Category 5 
storms – those with winds exceeding 254 kilometres 
per hour (km/h) – and were devastating for the 
Philippines (Ibid.). 
Typhoon Haiyan was one of the strongest typhoons 
that made landfall in the world, killing an estimated 
6,000 people (NDRRMC 2017). With wind speeds of 
more than 300 km/h and storm surges of over four 
metres, it damaged 591 municipalities and 57 cities 
across 44 provinces in the Philippines, affecting 16 
million people, 4 million of whom were displaced. 
Total financial losses were estimated to be US$12.9 
billion (Ibid.).
The damage caused by Typhoon Haiyan triggered a 
large-scale national and international response. The 
United Nations (UN) classified it as a Level 3 emergency 
and more than 45 international humanitarian agencies 
were deployed to assist those affected, through direct 
interventions and/or through the government (Carden 
and Clements 2015; Peters and Budimir 2015). 
One of the mechanisms used by the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UN OCHA) was to establish two technical working 
groups, for Accountability to Affected Populations 
and Communication with Communities. The main 
role of these groups was to ensure regular, two-way 
communication between those affected by the disaster 
and the responding agencies. They were mostly 
led by civil society organisations (CSOs), with local 
government units acting as convenors.
National-level coordination mechanisms were also 
set up to support the national government’s response 
mechanisms to Typhoon Haiyan. Accountability to 
affected populations was designated to the Department 
of Social Welfare and Development, which was also 
the lead agency for the response cluster.4 Putting 
accountability measures into operation was limited to 
the two technical working groups. 
Before this disaster, there was no established 
mechanism in the Philippines for documenting 
or monitoring accountability to those affected by 
disasters, with the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development’s mechanisms for gaining feedback 
from communities the only ones in use. But during 
the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, two platforms 
– the e-Management Platform: Accountability and 
Transparency Hub for Yolanda (eMPATHY) and Foreign 
Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH) platform – were 
created to record all the aid received by the national 
government, and to which projects this was allocated. 
However, humanitarian agencies, communities and 
even the government felt that these platforms were not 
very useful for the communities affected. 
Further, few reports have been written to discuss 
government accountability and transparency during 
emergencies in the Philippines. After Typhoon Haiyan, 
only the Commission on Audit came up with a solid 
report on disaster-related resources, expenditures 
and responses by various government agencies. The 
Commission on Audit (2014:19) acknowledged that 
“no single agency is actually monitoring the receipt 
and utilization of funds received as donation or grants 
for calamity victims”, and that it had not finalised 
its own guidelines for enhancing the auditing of 
disaster funds.
1.2 Research objectives
The overall objective of the research was to evaluate 
the tools, platforms and mechanisms at the national 
and community levels, specifically those that were used 
during Typhoon Haiyan, and determine how they were 
used to increase accountability to affected populations 
during and after disasters. 
The research initially identified online platforms: two 
technical working groups that supported accountability 
and coordination, and a government-established 
coordination structure for recovery and rehabilitation. 
It examined how these platforms and mechanisms 
could be improved to support accountability and 
transparency of government interventions for future 
disaster responses in the Philippines. 
1  An area in the Pacific Ocean basin where many earthquakes and volcanic eruptions occur.
2  Known as Typhoon Pablo in the Philippines.
3  Known as Super Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines.
4  Based on the Cluster approached adopted by the then National Disaster Coordinating Council through Memorandum Circular no. 
12 s.2008. See www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1334/NDRP_Hydro_Meteorological_Hazards_as_of_2014.pdf
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Consequently, the research also evaluated a range 
of other tools, platforms and mechanisms to see 
which could be enhanced and/or replicated in ways 
which ensure that the principles of accountability and 
transparency are observed. It considered integration in 
the vertical sense – across all levels of the government 
– and in the horizontal sense – across different 
agencies, sectors and institutions. 
2. Methodology
The research was designed following the Core 
Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability,5 
launched in 2014. This incorporates nine commitments 
that agencies can use as criteria when designing 
their disaster response plans and in the delivery of 
services. These also outline, to communities and people 
affected by disasters, what they can expect from the 
organisations and individuals delivering humanitarian 
assistance. 
From these nine commitments, we derived the following 
accountability principles for our data collection tools 
and analysis, to establish if the responses to Typhoon 
Haiyan: (1) were appropriate and relevant; (2) were 
effective and timely; (3) enabled communication, 
participation and feedback; (4) addressed complaints; 
(5) strengthened local capacities; (6) were 
coordinated and complementary; (7) led to learning 
and improvement; (8) increased staff effectiveness; 
and (9) enabled responsible resource management. 
The research was then implemented using multiple 
quantitative and qualitative methods.
Quantitative methods
We conducted a survey to evaluate the communities’ 
experiences and perceptions on the accountability 
tools, platforms and mechanisms that they were able 
to access, and to generate recommendations from 
them on how to improve accountability to affected 
populations. The city of Tacloban and the municipality 
of Tanauan, Leyte, were selected because they 
suffered the greatest number of casualties during 
Typhoon Haiyan and still have transitional shelters for 
those who lost their homes. Tacloban represents a 
highly urbanised area while Tanauan represents rural 
communities. 
The team selected communities that were, at the time 
of the research, still living in resettlement sites and 
transitional housing / evacuation sites provided by the 
government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and private entities, because these groups had received 
and / or were still receiving support from various 
institutions. The survey was conducted among 500 
residents in ten affected communities, and respondents 
were randomly selected from these sites based on a list 
provided by their local leaders. 
The survey had 41 questions which were developed 
to be used with Kobo Collect, a mobile data-collection 
tool. This meant that it could be filled out on mobile 
phones or tablet devices, and responses collated and 
encoded directly. Five data collectors were trained in 
how to use Kobo Collect, and they then conducted 
the survey in the ten municipalities. The survey 
was conducted over five days in both Tanauan and 
Tacloban, during the period August 29 – September 
10, 2016.
In total, 373 (74.6%) respondents were female 
and 127 (25.4%) were male. The mean age of all 
respondents was 54, ranging from 18 to 84 years 
old. In terms of civil status, 74% of respondents were 
married, 11% were widowed, 10% were ‘living-in’ (i.e. 
non-married couples), 3% were separated and 2% 
were single-headed households. 
The male respondents, particularly husbands, worked 
as skilled labourers, construction workers, fishermen 
and pedicab drivers.6 The female respondents, 
especially wives, owned a variety of stores and local 
eateries. Of the total respondents, 375 were earning 
less than 5,000 Phillipine pesos (PHP) a month 
(approximately US$99). Only 14 respondents had a 
family income of more than PHP10,000 a month.
Just over half (51.2%) of all respondents came from a 
different barangay7 to those in which the survey was 
conducted, meaning they had been resettled after 
the typhoon. The houses of almost all respondents 
(89.2%) were totally destroyed, while 68.4% lost other 
properties,8 and 56.8% lost their livelihood. In terms of 
the human cost, 44.8% had family members who were 
injured, 18.6% lost a family member or members, and 
8.6% had a family member or members still missing. 
5  https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/the-standard
6  A form of pedal-powered transport common in the Philippines.
7  As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, 
programmes, projects and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, 
crystallised and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled, according to the Local Government Code of the Philippines.
8  Immovable or movable private properties such as buildings and personal belongings, as stated in the Civil Code of the Philippines.
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Qualitative methods
After the survey responses were processed, we 
held focus group discussions in each community 
to elaborate on specific concerns raised during the 
survey. Community leaders selected 127 participants, 
79 female and 48 male. Each focus group discussion 
had an average of ten participants, apart from one to 
which several residents came.
During the research we also created mini case studies 
of the accountability platforms developed by various 
agencies for projects related to Typhoon Haiyan. 
Data for these was gathered through key informant 
interviews, reviewing documents and active online 
portals, and the participation of former agency staff as 
researchers in the study. We approached informants 
from national government agencies that are part of 
the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Council, members of the two technical working groups, 
and local government offices in Tacloban and Tanauan. 
From these, three government agencies, seven NGOs 
(from the technical working groups) and one local 
government office granted interviews, with 14 people 
interviewed in total.
In analysing the tools and platforms, we used the nine 
commitments of the Core Humanitarian Standard to 
evaluate if the criteria were observed in the content 
and / or operationalisation of the tools, platforms and 
mechanisms. 
3. Disasters and accountability in 
the Philippines
3.1 Accountability during disasters
The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2010: 
1) defines accountability as “the means through which 
power is used responsibly. It considers accountability 
as a process that considers the views of, and is held 
accountable by, different stakeholders, primarily the 
people affected by authority or power”. The Core 
Humanitarian Standard highlights that this power 
should be used responsibly to take account of, and be 
held accountable by different stakeholders and by those 
who were affected by the use of that power (Groupe 
URD et al. 2014). Meanwhile, the Steering Committee 
for Humanitarian Response (SCHR 2010) notes that 
there are many different levels of accountability, and 
different stakeholder groups to which an organisation 
is accountable: affected populations, funding agencies, 
government and the general public.
Further, the Humanitarian Accountability Report 
(CHS Alliance 2015: 8) states that “accountability 
and effectiveness mean different things to different 
people and are measured in different ways”, and that 
“being accountable is about taking responsibility for 
actions (and inaction), results, behaviours, successes, 
failures, mistakes, and for learning (not just gathering) 
lessons. Accountability does not flow only ’upwards‘ to 
donors or ’downwards‘ to communities, but rather in all 
directions between people and organisations who have 
a relationship to one another.”
3.2 Disaster governance in the 
Philippines
According to United Nation resolution, each state is 
responsible for the initiation, organisation, coordination 
and implementation of humanitarian assistance within 
its territory (Podger 2015). Since national governments 
are responsible for disaster recovery, most countries 
have created a national agency for disaster 
management to report overall disaster responses to the 
head of state (Ibid.).
The Philippines, as a middle-income country with one 
of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, has a well-
defined legal structure that is conducive for promoting 
accountability and transparency for disaster risk 
reduction and management (DRRM). The executive arm 
of the government – the president, the vice president 
and the cabinet secretaries of various government 
departments – leads the implementation and execution of 
policies at the national level (Blanco 2015). Government 
agencies9 have regional offices which support the 
implementation of national policies at the regional level. 
Elected local government officials, at the provincial, city, 
municipal and barangay levels, are responsible for actually 
implementing national policies and local ordinances. 
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Council, established under the Philippine Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Law in 2010 (the Republic 
Act 1012110), is the highest-level policy-making body 
9  These include commissions, authorities and bureaus that are not directly part of the executive branch, while government 
departments are part of the president’s cabinet and part of the executive.
10  See: www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=30820&cid=135
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for disaster management. It was created to establish 
an enabling environment for government action at all 
levels, and embed a culture of continued accountability 
to and communication with people affected by a 
disaster. It also advises the president on the disaster 
management responses taken by government bodies 
and the private sector. The Council is replicated at the 
regional and local levels, and these bodies function in 
a similar manner, operating and utilising resources at 
their respective levels (Commission on Audit 2014).
Different government departments oversee the 
following thematic areas of Republic Act 10121:
• Preparedness: the Department of Interior and Local 
Government 
• Response: the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development 
• Prevention and mitigation: the Department of 
Science and Technology 
• Rehabilitation and recovery: the National Economic 
and Development Authority.
Aside from these, the Office of Civil Defense, under 
the Department of National Defense, serves as the 
secretariat and implementing arm of the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. 
Alongside the regional, provincial and local DRRM 
councils are civil defense offices that support local 
disaster governance. The Office of Civil Defense 
conducts DRRM planning, training, coordination, 
emergency response, and operational support to 
the national and local government. During Typhoon 
Haiyan, the Office of Civil Defense continued to support 
the Council while coordinating with international 
and local organisations, private groups and local 
government units.
The Republic Act 10121 provides the legal basis 
and mandate for local government accountability 
pertaining to disaster risk reduction and management 
(DRRM).11 For example, it established local DRRM 
offices at all levels – province, city and municipality – 
which are responsible for designing, programming and 
coordinating DRRM activities in each local government 
unit, and for formulating comprehensive and integrated 
local DRRM plans. They are also mandated to facilitate 
and support risk assessments, consolidate local 
disaster risk information and operate multi-hazard 
warning systems. 
In terms of capacity-building and knowledge 
management for DRR, Section 12 of the Act stipulates 
that each local DRRM office should organise and 
conduct training and orientation, disseminate 
information, organise public awareness campaigns, 
and ensure the maintenance and provision of human 
resources, equipment and facilities for DRRM. During 
emergencies, the offices are responsible for responding 
to and managing adverse effects, and for ensuring 
recovery. To realise this, each local government unit 
has a DRRM fund, equivalent to not less than 5% of its 
regular revenues; 30% of this is put aside as a quick 
response fund for post-disaster relief and recovery 
efforts. Given their mandate and resources, and their 
access to and familiarity with local communities, local 
government units are, theoretically, in the best position 
to undertake DRRM activities, including providing 
information to communities. Unfortunately, they face 
several challenges that mean many fail in fulfilling these 
tasks (this is discussed later in this research report). 
Because of the scale of devastion wrought by Typhoon 
Haiyan, the government established the Office of the 
Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery 
to serve as the overall manager and coordinator of 
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts. 
This Office oversaw the formulation of plans and 
programmes for affected areas; proposed funding 
support for the implementation of these plans and 
programmes; and reported on the progress of each 
programme’s implementation (Co, Pamintuan and Dino 
2016; National Economic and Development Agency nd). 
It was expected to work with the Office of Civil Defense 
in assisting local government units affected by Typhoon 
Haiyan in their recovery and rehabiliation efforts.
Despite these measures, the monitoring and evaluation 
of progress in terms of disaster response still occurred 
in silos; for example, the Department of Social Welfare 
and Development only considered its own interventions 
The Philippines has a well-defined legal structure that is conducive for 
promoting accountabilty and transparency for disaster risk reduction 
and management. 
11  According to the Republic Act 10121, DRRM refers to systematic process of implementing strategies, policies and coping capacities 
to reduce the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster; by contrast, disaster risk reduction (DRR) focuses on the 
concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters 
(UN 2009).
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when monitoring programme implementation. As 
a result, affected communities were not given a 
comprehensive picture of what was happening on the 
ground. Financial accountability was also lacking: only 
the Commission on Audit could report on disaster-
related expenditures in 2014, and there was no single 
government agency in charge of working on the receipt 
and use of funds for emergency responses – thus no 
one was held accountable for not reporting these 
matters (Commission on Audit 2014). 
However, Carden and Clements (2015) report that 
there were longstanding relationships between the 
government and the other actors, including CSOs 
and NGOs, mainly because of the many disasters 
that had already struck the Philippines. This meant 
that coordination between the government and 
these organisations was strong from the outset. As 
established under national law in 2007, government-
led humanitarian clusters led and oversaw the 
coordination of responses to Typhoon Haiyan, with 
support from international actors (Scriven 2013). 
3.3 The Accountability to Affected 
Populations and Communication 
with Communities technical 
working groups
Related to this lack of coordinated monitoring and 
evaluation, accountability and transparency efforts 
during the response to Tyhoon Haiyan were very 
limited. Among the efforts that did take place were 
the establishment of the technical working groups for 
Communication with Communities and Accountability 
to Affected Populations. 
In 2013, the Philippines was facing problems on many 
fronts. Still recovering from Typhoon Bopha in 2012, an 
armed conflict between the Moro National Liberation 
Front and government forces in September caused 
further issues, with 119,000 people displaced and over 
10,000 homes destroyed. A month later, the Bohol 
earthquake hit the country. 
This series of disasters highlighted the need for 
affected communities have accurate and timely 
information. In response, the Communication with 
Communities technical working group was established 
as an humanitarian inter-cluster communications 
support and coordination mechanism. The group was 
set up to: provide a connection between survivors 
and their families; raise early warnings and risk 
awareness; and relay information about the services 
available communities, as well as hygiene and disease 
prevention. It focused on meeting the information and 
communication needs of affected populations. This 
group also benefitted the humanitarian community 
by helping to reduce the duplication of messages and 
interventions, circumventing conflicting information, 
addressing information gaps and ensuring community 
feedback was addressed (Carden and Clements 2015; 
CDAC Network 2014a). 
This group brought together all the actors working 
on public information and community resource 
mobilisation, resulting in the conduct of series 
of transparency ‘forum caravans’.12 As an early 
task, various UN agencies and international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs), with support 
from the Philippine Information Agency and local 
government units, conducted the first coordinated 
assessment of information needs and preferred 
communication channels among affected communities. 
The Accountability to Affected Populations group 
played a coherent role in advocating the needs of 
affected populations through supporting and linking 
cross-cutting issues such as gender, protection (e.g. 
child protection, protection from abuse, protection 
from gender-based violence) and communication 
with communities.13 It also helped humanitarian 
organisations by providing analysed, processed 
information which could quickly be used and 
understood, rather than these organisations having to 
collect and analyse community-level data themselves. 
The group also provided a clear framework for the 
provision of high-quality, equitable services to all 
segments of the affected communities. 
Despite these achievements, the Communication with 
Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) Network (2014a) 
found that running two separate technical working groups 
created unnecessary silos. Though the terms of reference 
for each were clear at the onset, at the local level there 
Related to this lack of coordinated monitoring and evaluation, accountability 
and transparency efforts during the response to Tyhoon Haiyan were 
very limited. 
12  Forum caravans involve different NGOs and UN agencies going to communities to hold a forum with the people affected by 
a disaster.
13  There was some overlap in responsibilities between the two technical working groups, and many people were members of both.
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seemed to be overlapping functions; for example, both 
groups looked at transparency, information provision, 
participation, and feedback and complaints. 
In some affected places, however, the two groups 
were more closely integrated. Communities including 
Guian, Ormoc and Tacloban set up the jointly managed 
Accountability to Affected Populations–Communication 
with Communities (AAP–CwC) technical working 
groups. According to UN OCHA, this resulted in a 
“richer and complete picture of information, two-
way communication and the differential need of 
communities with CwC providing far greater technical 
expertise and depth on the subject matter, and AAP 
providing a stronger and broader social and rights-
based framework within which to locate and guide 
the work” (CDAC Network 2014b: 5). Having joint 
technical working groups made the flow of information 
much more relevant, as it was more clearly aimed 
at improving the quality and results of programmes, 
leading to better decision-making (Carden and 
Clements 2015; CDAC Network 2014a). 
Wigley (2015), in a case study undertaken as part 
of the response to Typhoon Haiyan, emphasised 
that addressing a community’s communications, 
information and connectivity needs is a clear priority 
in any humanitarian response. The quality of the 
communications work after Typhoon Haiyan was greatly 
enhanced by the merging of the two technical working 
groups: the Accountability to Affected Populations 
group provided a focus that encouraged involvement 
with communities at a deeper level, clear problem 
definition, the consideration of cross-cutting issues 
and greater follow through and responses to two-way 
communication. Together, the two technical working 
groups effectively combined technological expertise 
and social science (Ibid.). 
4. Case studies of accountability 
tools, platforms and mechanisms
In the spirit of transparency and accountability, and 
in response to public clamour to know where relief 
resources were being used, the government established 
several national-level tools, platforms and mechanisms 
to enable public reporting. These attempted to record 
the aid received from various donors for the response 
to Typhoon Haiyan, as well as the status of relief 
programmes and projects. This section discusses these 
tools, platforms and mechanisms. 
4.1 The Office of the Presidential 
Assistant for Recovery and 
Rehabilitation 
The colossal damage that the disaster brought 
to millions of Filipinos made it necessary for the 
government to create an office to lead reconstruction 
and rehabilitation efforts. The Office of the Presidential 
Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery was 
established under former President Benigno Simeon 
Aquino III on December 6, 2013. Senator Panfilo 
Lacson served as head of this office from its creation 
to February 2015, the period during which most relief 
efforts for Typhoon Haiyan took place.
Specifically, the Office was responsible for harmonising 
the initiatives and efforts of various government 
agencies and other relevant bodies, such as 
international organisations, private sector companies 
and foundations, engaged in post-Haiyan rehabilitation. 
To perform its roles and responsibilities effectively, 
the Office coordinated with the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council and consultated 
with concerned local government units. 
As part of its mandate, the Office led the 
development of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation 
and Recovery Program, which was approved on 
October 30, 2014, with a budget of PHP170.9 billion 
(approximately US$3.38 billion). This progamme, 
which took nine months to finalise, consolidated 
the various rehabilitation efforts into five clusters: 
(1) infrastructure; (2) resettlement; (3) social services; 
(4) livelihoods; and (5) support.14 
The process of formulating this programme was guided 
by the principle of ‘building back better and safer’, 
which promotes holistic and sustainable rehabilitation 
and recovery initiatives. Specifically, it advocates for: 
planning and constructing disaster-resilient facilities, 
infrastructure and resettlement sites; seeking viable 
livelihood opportunities for affected populations, 
including small and medium enterprises and growing 
typhoon-resistant crops; and enhancing social 
protection mechanisms in areas affected by a disaster. 
14  These were identified by implementing agencies, including the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Housing and Urban 
Development Coordinating Council, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Department of Budget and Management and the National Economic and Development Authority.
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4.2 The Foreign Aid 
Transparency Hub
The Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH) was designed 
as an online platform to allow the government to track 
foreign aid for victims of Typhoon Haiyan, and allow the 
public to look at the status of foreign aid channelled 
through government agencies. Initially launched in 
December 2013 and relaunched in April 2014, the 
platform holds information primarily on humanitarian 
assistance pledged or given by countries and international 
organisations, as well as donations coursed through the 
Commission on Filipinos Overseas’ ‘Lingkod sa Kapwa 
Pilipino’ programme (World Bank GFDRR et al. 2015). 
FAiTH also holds data on donations coursed through 
Philippine embassies abroad, aid assistance (both financial 
and in-kind donations) coming from overseas Filipino 
workers, foreign donors and local donations from private 
groups and organisations (Government Gazette 2017). 
Each embassy or organisation is given a unique 
account, with a username and password, which 
allows it to input and update pledges. Data is updated 
regularly, and each transaction generates a unique 
transaction identification number. Apart from the online 
updates, a Note Verbale is officially communicated to 
the Department of Foreign Affairs for each pledge. 
Foreign donors are expected to notify the Philippine 
government about their pledges before these are posted 
on the platform, and donations should be channelled 
through government aid agencies or the Philippine 
Red Cross (as an NGO member of the National Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management Council). However, 
during the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, only officially 
declared pledges were recorded on FAiTH; some foreign 
donors preferred not to put costs on their assistance, 
especially for non-cash support. The platform was easy 
to manage and information was updated regularly. 
A FAiTH Task Force was created to monitor the data 
coming into the portal.15 The challenge was that while 
the platform displayed all the pledges, it did not reflect 
where these were being used. This prevented the public 
from sending feedback or asking questions about 
how certain amounts were used or allocated. FAiTH 
was eventually shut down and replaced by eMPATHY, 
which covered all other funds for Typhoon Haiyan. Its 
website16 is no longer operational, but the Department 
of Budget and Management still publishes the FAiTH 
report on the Philippine government’s official website.17 
4.3 The e-Management Platform: 
Accountability and Transparency 
Hub for Yolanda 
In January 2014, almost three months after Typhoon 
Haiyan hit the Philippines, the Office of the Presidential 
Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery asked the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for 
assistance with developing an information management 
system for project monitoring. The government 
needed to increase transparency and accountability 
in managing the aid and assistance given for the 
country’s recovery and reconstruction efforts, 
particularly at the local level, since the FAiTH platform 
had not been able to track donations directed to local 
government units and coming from local donors. A 
scoping mission was conducted to assess the needs, 
capacities and institutional framework for establishing 
an aid management tracking system in the Philippines. 
UNDP launched a call for proposals and SYNERGY 
International was awarded the contract to develop a 
software platform that aligned with the needs of the 
Office (World Bank GFDRR et al. 2015). The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
provided technical assistance worth US$10 million to 
support this, and the result was eMPATHY, an online 
platform which listed the rehabilitation projects being 
implemented by local, national and foreign groups in 
areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan.18 
Information presented in eMPATHY included: donors; 
types of rehabilitation project; the names of the winning 
contractors; the dates of contracts being awarded; 
the status of project implementation; and the cost 
of projects. This information covered 171 cities and 
municipalities from 14 provinces in six affected regions. 
The Office envisioned that eMPATHY would help to 
ensure that all involved agencies and stakeholders 
would refer to a common, unified platform for projects 
and programmes, and it achieved this: eMPATHY 
provided a comprehensive, centralised system for 
tracking the progress of response and recovery efforts. 
This information was largely intended for the public 
to access.
Government agencies, international organisations, 
and private organisations and foundations – the 
implementers of relief efforts – were given access to 
the platform and instructed to provide updates on 
their projects (World Bank GFBDRR et al. 2015) to 
15  Members included representatives from the Department of Budget and Management, the Commission on Filipino Overseas, the 
Department of Finance, the Department of Health, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development, the National Economic and Development Authority, the Office of Civil Defense, the Office of the Presidential 
Spokesperson, Presidential Management Staff, and the Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office. 
The Commission on Audit provided advisory support (Government Gazette 2017).
16  Weblink no longer active
17  See www.officialgazette.gov.ph/faith/full-report
18  Weblink no longer active
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help ensure the data was kept up to date. They enter 
data on interventions that they plan to do, which are 
verified and submitted online. Once the project has 
been approved, implementation progress is periodically 
updated. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for 
Rehabilitation and Recovery also formed a team to 
encourage partners to upload their information. 
eMPATHY was envisioned as an information and 
monitoring platform to promote accountability, allowing 
individuals and groups to follow the development of 
projects and report issues and problems when necessary 
(e.g. the use of substandard materials). But it also 
helped the Office to analyse recovery programmes once 
completed, and identify where interventions were still 
lacking. This helped to point donors and agencies to 
geographic areas needing assistance (Avendano 2014). 
As with many technology platforms, however, eMPATHY 
had several limitations. First, users felt that it was time-
consuming to evaluate the data for compatibility and 
validity. The authenticity of data was also in question, 
especially when several projects were being uploaded 
with no clear validation mechanism on the ground. The 
processing of data could not be accomplished in real 
time as the encoding takes a lot of time without any 
dedicated staff to do it from the contributing agencies. 
Further, projects are often planned in different formats, 
for example on spreadsheets or using Word templates. 
Such formats were incompatible with eMPATHY’s data 
fields, so importing them often led to technical glitches. 
There was also the challenge of human resources, with 
no dedicated web administrator or government agency 
with a budget allocation to maintain the system. 
The biggest limitation, however, was the platform’s 
failure to ensure that all system users were held 
accountable for submitting data, especially since, at 
that time, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for 
Rehabilitation and Recovery had no mandate to compel 
all agencies to submit their data. The website was 
closed down in 2016.
4.4 The OpenBUB portal
Bottom-up budgeting (BUB) is an approach to the 
preparation of agency budget proposals that considers 
the development needs of cities / municipalities, as 
identified in their poverty reduction action plans, 
which are formulated with the strong participation 
of community-based organisations and other CSOs. 
Bottom-up budgeting in the Philippines can be traced 
back to 2010, when President Benigno Aquino III 
formulated his 16-point agenda, the ‘Social Contract 
with the Filipino People’.
Bottom-up budgeting projects for disaster response 
/ rehabilitation and DRR in municipalities hit by 
Typhoon Haiyan were included in the 2014 national 
planning process, and funded through the General 
Appropriations Act of 2015. Unlike in previous years, 
the bottom-up budgeting process for 2015 included 
all local government units nationwide. This meant that 
all those affected by Typhoon Haiyan were given an 
opportunity to maximise the number of DRR projects 
in their plans. When implementing these projects, local 
government units were made accountable for ensuring 
that government procurement, budgeting, accounting 
and auditing rules and regulations were observed. They 
were also responsible for ensuring that the design and 
cost of these projects did not exceed the cost of similar 
projects being implemented by national government 
agencies in the same locality. 
Following on from this, the OpenBUB (bottom-up 
budgeting) Portal19 was launched during the last 
quarter of 2016. The Department of Interior and 
Local Government, which hosts the Bottom-up 
Budgeting Project Management Office, was tasked with 
administering this website. Three staff per government 
agency were assigned to upload quarterly reports, 
with each staff member undertaking different tasks to 
ensure the validity and correctness of the reports. 
• A reporter encodes the status reports, thus starting 
the reporting process. 
• A submitter reviews the encoded report and submits 
it to the portal. 
• A validator confirms and resubmits the report, after 
the necessary corrections and editing are complete. 
The OpenBUB Portal has displayed some functionality 
as a monitoring tool for transparency. Through its 
reporting systems, it has provided the public with up-
to-date information (quarterly reports) on bottom-up 
budgeting projects. Also notable is the putting in place 
of a unified reporting system across agencies, which 
ensures the timely input of data to the portal.
However, these gains will inevitably be affected by 
the directions of the new administration of President 
Rodrigo Duterte. One of its first official actions was 
to scrap the bottom-up budgeting programme. 
Subsequently, projects for 2017 were not budgeted in 
the 2017 General Appropriations Act. 
4.5 Open Reconstruction
Open Reconstruction20 is a free-to-use public website 
that balances transparency and the public’s right to 
know with the need for efficiency in governance. Its 
main use is the tracking of reconstruction projects and 
requests for reconstruction support during disaster 
situations, including Typhoon Haiyan and the Bohol 
19  http://openbub.gov.ph/. 
20  http://openreconstruction.gov.ph/. 
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earthquake in 2013. Through this website, the media, 
local governments and individuals can access all kinds 
of important information about projects, including: 
status; a summary of requests for reconstruction 
projects; processing times; and costs. Maps of damaged 
infrastructure are also available, including the location 
of the project site, and are easily viewed through a 
navigation feature. Other features include a feedback 
mechanism and interactive mechanisms to share 
information easily through social media. Combined, 
these mean that users can easily make sense of the 
volumes of data held, through graphs and charts 
included in the website, and share these as desired. 
Many of the requests made to the website conflicted 
vertically (from the local to the national level) and 
horizontally (across local governments, or across 
national government agencies), for example because 
some offices still use paper-based processes 
for making requests. It was difficult to get some 
government offices to commit to a single unified 
process, especially since for some this would mean 
creating extra steps in their own internal processes. 
Ultimately, one of the greatest challenges is the 
current lack of use. The system is in place, but it is not 
yet being used by some government agencies. More 
importantly, information must be uploaded regularly to 
achieve transparency, and all local government units 
must ensure that they are doing this – but this is not 
happening due to various reasons, such as a lack of 
designated personnel to upload information, continued 
use of paper-based filing and requesting, and a lack of 
training on how to use the platform. 
4.6 Communication with 
Communities technical working 
group and community of practice
The networks and relationships within the 
Communication with Communities technical working 
group were strengthened during Typhoon Haiyan. This 
enabled communication with community initiatives to 
get off the ground quickly when Typhoon Hagupit21 hit 
in 2014. Through UN OCHA’s efforts, the First Response 
Radio–Far-East Broadcasting Company and the Peace 
and Conflict Journalism Network met and agreed to 
deploy a joint team to set up a humanitarian radio 
station in the municipality of Taft, Eastern Samar, which 
was the area worst hit by Typhoon Hagupit. 
The Communication with Communities technical 
working group evolved to become a Community 
of Practice on Community Engagement in Eastern 
Visayas,22 as part of the preparedness initiative in 
this region. This was done in response to the need 
for a formal network to mainstream an integrated, 
coordinated approach to communication, accountability 
and community participation, especially in times 
of disaster. Through this, members could put both 
technologies (e.g. solar radios) and staff in place 
days before the typhoon made land. The use of social 
media and pre-evacuation community consultations 
and assessments, as well as strong coordination with 
the local government units, worked successfully after 
Typhoon Hagupit, according to an assessment made by 
members of the Community of Practice. 
In January 2015, UN OCHA formalised this Community 
of Practice by giving it terms of reference, a 
strategy and a work plan. Further, its role combined 
communications, accountability, community 
participation and common service partnerships, when 
initially the technical working groups considered 
communication and accountability as separate 
issues. It is currently chaired by UN OCHA, with 
technical support from the CDAC Network and other 
humanitarian organisations that have been involved in 
the mainstreaming of communication, accountability 
and community participation in the Philippines since 
2012. UN OCHA also serves as the overall secretariat. 
Today, the Community of Practice on Community 
Engagement acts as an inclusive, cross-sector 
coordination and technical support group that brings 
together all those working on community engagement. 
As well as those involved in the initial technical working 
group (see Section 3.3), it includes the private sector 
(specifically telecommunication companies and online 
media networks), faith-based groups, academia, and 
the mainstream media and humanitarian press. It 
provides recommendations, updates and relevant 
reports to the Humanitarian Country Team,23 both 
in terms of disaster preparedness and response. 
Information about disaster response (e.g. available 
services, resources, research undertakings, and best 
practices) is shared systematically with affected 
communities through appropriate channels (e.g. 
flyers, reports, presentations in meetings). In terms 
of preparedness, various measures help to share 
life-saving information related to early warnings and 
community-based preparedness. 
Its effective coordination and partnerships mean 
the Community of Practice has been able to share 
information effectively with people before, during 
21  Known as Typhoon Ruby in the Philippines.
22  This was where most of the NGOs were working at that time, since Eastern Visayas was the worst-affected region.
23  The Humanitarian Country Team is a strategic and operational decision-making and oversight forum, established and led by the 
Humanitarian Coordinator. It is responsible for agreeing on common strategic issues related to humanitarian action. It is comprised 
of representatives from the UN, the International Organization for Migration, international NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
Movement. Agencies that are designated cluster leads should represent the clusters as well as their respective organisations. 
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and after emergencies, and ensure communities 
participate meaningfully in relief processes. But it is 
large, comprising around 50 organisations. Further, 
it is highly diverse and includes organisations with 
limited capacities and resources. Having so many 
agencies in one system continues to create challenges. 
For example, the size of some of its technical working 
groups means that outcomes are slow to realise, 
and the coordination of joint communication and 
information needs assessments, as well as the 
monitoring of communications initiatives during 
responses, are not always sufficient. Further, some 
agency managers still fail to understand the importance 
of the Community of Practice, which leads to a focus 
on implementing each agency’s respective mandates 
instead of collaborative initiatives. 
5. Accountability at the 
community level
While national platforms for DRR accountability are 
useful for stakeholders in need of this level of data, 
information needs vary greatly at the community level, 
as the survey of communities affected by Typhoon 
Haiyan demonstrated. The data provided provides 
insights into how accountability mechanisms and 
procedures were implemented at the community level in 
the aftermath of this disaster, and how effective these 
were in increasing transparency and accountability.
5.1 Community experiences of 
transparency and accountability 
during Typhoon Haiyan
Appropriateness and relevance of services 
provided
Due to the considerable losses caused by the disaster, 
96.4% of survey respondents received relief from 
their barangay or local government unit, and 93% 
received relief from NGOs or private entities. The 
types of relief received included housing materials 
(65%),24 cash-for-work from NGOs and private entities 
(37.4%), cash-for-work from government agencies 
(14.4%), livelihood assistance such as poultry or 
transport services such as boats or pedicabs (27%),25 
medical assistance (23.2%), cash for burials or cash 
for medical assistance (13.4%), and transport for 
evacuation (3.4%). 
As examples, the average amounts received were:
• PHP260 per day for cash-for-work, from the 
government and from NGOs / private entities 
• PHP5,000 for medical assistance
• PHP10,000 for burial assistance.
Respondents felt that the services that were provided 
were appropriate to their needs, especially during the 
initial stages of the emergency response. The services 
outlined above were based on the services usually 
provided by humanitarian agencies during a disaster. 
Timeliness and quality of the information 
provided
During the focus group discussions, respondents 
shared that in the initial stages of the emergency 
response, they valued information as much as the 
services being provided. They considered receiving 
timely information to be an important task for the 
government, as being provided with accurate, on-time 
information could save lives. 
During the focus group discussions, respondents shared that in the initial 
stages of the emergency response, they valued information as much as the 
services being provided. They considered receiving timely information to 
be an important task for the government, as being provided with accurate, 
on-time information could save lives. 
24  This direct housing assistance came from both the government and NGOs; 75% received cash support while 25% received cash vouchers.
25  Of the 115 respondents receiving livelihood assistance, 14 received this from the government and the rest received it from various 
other sources.
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Before Typhoon Haiyan struck, people knew it was 
coming and that it would be strong. They were 
informed through television, radio, barangay officials, 
neighbours and local government units. Those who 
lived in danger areas, or in houses made of light 
materials, were taken to designated evacuation 
centres (e.g. sports complexes, schools, churches 
and supermarkets) or stayed with neighbours in 
sturdier houses. 
However, the information on the typhoon’s nature, 
including the possible impact of storm surge, was 
inadequate. Communities therefore made the same 
preparations as for other typhoons. Some said later 
that, the day before Typhoon Haiyan, the sun was up 
and they never expected that there would be such 
a storm surge. They said that if warnings had used 
the term ‘tsunami’, then they would have understood 
what was coming. Thus, when the typhoon struck, 
they were taken by surprise at its height and the 
intensity of the flood it brought. And, unknown to 
them, the places to which they were evacuated were 
often also at risk.
When the typhoon struck, people were dazed; they 
could not believe what had happened. And everybody 
was concerned with their own safety and their family’s 
safety – including the people involved in rescue 
operations. One barangay official said that he lost two 
children and started burying them in the middle of the 
road as a temporary burial site. Consequently, there 
was no one directing on what should be done and 
everybody seemed to be acting on their own. 
Many people slept in the rain on the first night and 
few had any food. Indeed, for many there was no 
food relief or assistance during the first three days 
after the typhoon. Community members were told by 
their local officials that the food packages prepared 
for distribution were all washed out by the storm 
surge. This was just one of many failures in local 
governance at the height of the disaster, resulting in 
greater losses and risks at the community level. 
Information dissemination was also inadequate 
and chaotic at this time. People were receiving 
information from various sources, but there was not 
always two-way communication. Some communities 
had no means of sending back information about 
their whereabouts, because there was no electricity 
or mobile phone signals. Some local government 
officials came and explained why there was a delay 
in the delivery of relief goods, mainly because the 
stationed relief goods were destroyed and the 
relief goods coming from Manila were held up due 
to a delay in their transportation. But due to the 
inconsistent approach to sharing information, on the 
third day after the typhoon, some residents learned 
that a mall had been forcibly opened and went to get 
food. Some store owners in the neighbourhood gave 
the food free to residents. 
Processes for providing services after a disaster 
are complex – one official described these as 
“complicated and difficult to comply with” – which 
prevented the government from implementing DRRM 
programmes effectively immediately after Typhoon 
Haiyan. As well as the many requirements, there 
were also violations of rules and inconsistency in 
following procedures. For example, it was said that 
only those who were in the temporary shelters could 
receive permanent shelters. However, some people 
did not stay in the temporary shelters but in housing 
units in the resettlement area – leading to confusion 
about what their entitlements were. The selection of 
beneficiaries rests with local government officials, 
and some people said that politics seemed to 
influence this, with those having opposition political 
affiliations not being treated equally. 
In reality, it was the alternative, non-government 
support systems that enabled communities to 
respond, survive and recover from the disaster. 
There is a strong sentiment among those affected 
by disasters in the Philippines – Typhoon Haiyan and 
others – that government agencies are ineffective 
in responding during and immediately after such 
events. They are more grateful to the NGOs and 
international humanitarian agencies, including the 
UN agencies, that provide cash for work, relief goods, 
medical services and other emergency assistance. 
There is a perception that other residents are a 
greater source of support than the government; 
people help each other, for example looking 
for missing family members, sharing food, and 
helping to clean away debris and solid waste from 
affected areas.
Box 1. The realities of providing information before, during and after a 
major disaster event
The magnitude of damage and the high survival level of 
the population after Typhoon Haiyan meant it was critical 
for them to be given information on the types of services 
they would receive, among other things. The survey 
revealed that people placed almost equal importance on 
the need for information from the government and NGOs. 
This included information, from both sources, about what 
services would be provided; when these would be given; 
who the beneficiaries would be; how often the services 
would be provided; and who would be providing them. 
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The survey revealed that 42.4% of respondents 
received information within 3–5 days of the disaster 
event, while 11.2% only got information after a month 
and 5% of respondents never got any information. 
And, despite the rapid provision of information to some 
people, respondents felt that the immediate information 
provided about the services they really needed was 
zero. Instead, they only received information about 
the casualties and the scope of the disaster, not about 
the help that was on the way. This aggravated their 
desperate situations, which resulted in chaotic scenes 
in the immediate aftermath. For example, people had 
no one to approach regarding their basic need for food, 
and had to get this from department stores – which 
was often labelled as looting. This demonstrates how a 
lack of information can contribute to a lapse or loss in 
peace, order and authority after disaster events. 
Even after the immediate emergency phase was over, 
those responsible for providing assistance did not 
provide information that could help people on a regular 
basis. According to respondents, these agencies 
(including barangay officials, local government units, 
community leaders, the Department of Social Welfare 
and Development, NGOs, the media and the Philippine 
Information Agency) only provided information 
intermittently. This failed to meet the desired frequency: 
people wanted information on at least a weekly basis, 
with a daily basis the next preferred frequency. 
A further issue was the trustworthiness of information. 
Most respondents claimed that, of the information they 
received, they particularly doubted information about 
cash assistance and the provision of emergency shelter 
assistance; both of these were given in cash. There 
were strong feelings that they were not receiving the 
amounts promised by the relevant authorities. When 
asked during the focus group discussions on who they 
trusted most, residents mentioned NGOs, particulary 
one faith-based organisation that gave them cash 
assistance way above the amounts provided by other 
organisations and government agencies. To validate 
the information received, most respondents asked their 
barangay officials.
Addressing grievances and feedback
Conversations with affected residents brought many 
greivances to the surface. Figure 1 shows that the first 
source of grievances pertained to livelihood options, 
which were limited in the affected areas before Typhoon 
Haiyan and worsened after the disaster. Many of the 
resettlement areas were located far from the cities, 
displacing many people from their sources of livelihood. 
Since many of these were informal settlers who 
depended on trading and providing casual labour, they 
were placed in a situation where they could not earn a 
living. Many others were fishermen, and the relocation 
sites were far from the sea.
The second major source of grievances related to 
the provision of relief goods by the barangay and 
local government units. Respondents identified 
unequal distribution as a major source of greivance: 
some people did nor receive relief goods during the 
distribution process, particularly those living in distant 
Figure 1. Focus of grievances of respondents about the relief services provided
Livelihood assistance
Relief goods from barangay 
or local government unit
Housing materials
Relief goods from NGOs and 
private entity
Cash for work from 
government
Cash for work from NGO / 
private entity
Cash for burial or medical 
assistance
Medical assistance
Transport for evacuation
Educational assistance
                                                                                             118
                                                                                          114
                                                                 84
                                                               82
                             41
                       34
               24
               24
            20
          18
Grievance                                            Number of respondents
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Figure 2. Participation rating by survey respondents (scale: 1–10)
I was consulted about decisions related to my 
needs and the services I need to receive.
The services I have received were based on the 
needs I expressed.
I had the opportunity to influence plans related 
to the services that will be provided to us.
I used this opportunity to influence plans related 
to the services that will be provided to us.
I asserted my rights to influence plans and 
decisions related to the services that I need and 
will be provided to us.
                                       4.85
                                                                     5.08
                       4.72
         4.62
                                 4.80
Statement                                                                  Rating
areas. There were also complaints that high-quality 
relief goods, such as imported corned beef and meat 
loaf, were not distributed, with lower-quality goods 
(such as sardines) given instead. 
Respondents have identified barangay officials and 
NGO representatives as those most likely to receive 
and listen to their grievances and questions. Many 
respondents said that they informed their barangay 
officials about these grievances. However, respondents 
in the focus group discussions felt strongly that nothing 
was done in response to their grievances. They also 
shared their grievances with people from outside these 
agencies, such as researchers and the media. 
Some respondents in the focus group discussions 
shared that they opted to keep their grievances to 
themselves after the disasters, because they were 
afraid of possible rebuttal or the consequences of 
complaining against leaders and those in authority, 
such as worsening personal relationships with these 
leaders. For example, some people affected by 
Typhoon Haiyan were asked to sign a payroll to receive 
PHP30,000, but they did not ever get this. They did 
not complain, however, because they were afraid that 
they might be removed from the list of beneficiaries for 
other government programmes, such as the conditional 
cash programme for the poor. 
Participation in disaster response and 
service provision
A few survey respondents acted as service providers 
during the response to Typhoon Haiyan, but they still 
considered themselves as needing assistance and 
services. In answering this question, they considered 
service providers to be the local government units, 
NGOs and other humanitarian organisations. 
On a scale of 1–10, with 10 being the highest, survey 
respondents rated a series of statements related to 
their participation in the delivery of relief services. 
Figure 2 shows that while some respondents were given 
a chance to be involved and provide feedback related 
to the services they were receiving, not all participated. 
During the focus group discussions, participants stated 
that they felt that whatever they had to say would not 
be heard by the government, which is why most of them 
opted to wait for whatever support they received. 
Awareness of national accountability platforms
The survey revealed that very few respondents were 
aware of the various national-level accountability 
platforms and measures (see Section 4), as Figure 3 
shows. This was further confirmed during the validation 
of the research with communities, who all said that they 
did not know about these platforms. 
Figure 3. Awareness of accountability platforms among affected communities
eMPATHY
Office of the Presidential Assistant 
for Recovery and Rehabilitation
Open Reconstruction
FAiTH
                                                                          9
                                                              8
                           5
   3
Accountability platform                        Number of people aware of the platform (out of 500)
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To  improve the provision of services, respondents recommended that they 
should be allowed to provide clear information about what they need, and 
this should form the basis for determining the services that they receive. They 
also want to receive what is promised to them as quickly as possible. 
In November 2016, during the third anniversary 
of Typhoon Haiyan, President Duterte came to 
Tacloban and announced that all those who were 
affected would be given cash assistance. However, 
as of January 2017, people said that nothing had 
been given. During an interview, the Department 
of Social Welfare and Development clarified that 
only those who had not yet received any financial 
assistance would be given cash assistance. The 
problem was that expectations had already been 
raised by the president’s promise. 
Unfulfilled promises such as this pose a challenge 
for residents and community leaders, even long 
after a disaster had occurred. And as residents 
complain about the services they are promised 
but do not receive, community leaders lose their 
morale; they are caught in the middle, between the 
residents and the government agencies.
Box 2. The impact of failing to 
deliver on promises
5.2 Challenges and 
recommendations from 
respondents
Respondents were asked about the challenges they 
faced in securing proper services. In terms of services 
from barangay officials, these included having to meet 
too many requirements to get assistance, long waits for 
services to be delivered, and not being prioritised even 
if they were from vulnerable groups. 
At the city and municipal government level, 
respondents faced challenges such as being directed 
back to their barangays or communities for assistance. 
Others were given promises of support but then did 
not receive this on time, and sometimes not at all. 
They were also asked to go back to their municipal 
or city hall – to no avail. Respondents faced these 
same problems when they approached the national 
government agencies. 
To improve the provision of services, respondents 
recommended that they should be allowed to provide 
clear information about what they need, and this 
should form the basis for determining the services 
that they receive. They also want to receive what is 
promised to them as quickly as possible.
To improve access to information during and after 
disasters, respondents suggested that dissemination 
should be more localised. For example, barangay 
officials and local community leaders should be 
mobilised to provide accurate information to their 
communities. They wanted information to be provided 
through bulletins, house-to-house information 
campaigns from official sources, and via local news 
networks.
6. Findings and analysis
The research reviewed the many different tools, 
platforms and mechanisms that aim to increase 
accountability after disasters in the Philippines, 
including those established in the wake of Typhoon 
Haiyan (see Section 4) and those already in place. 
These are used across the different levels of 
government in the Philippines. While these tools, 
platforms and mechanisms were perceived as making 
humanitarian agencies and the government more 
accountable, our research found that the concept of 
accountability was grealty misconstrued in terms of 
information dissemination and reporting. 
6.1 Making accountability 
operational at different 
governance levels 
One focus of our research was to establish how 
accountability during disasters is operationalised by 
the Philippine government, a challenge that was greatly 
manifested during the Typhoon Haiyan response. The 
previous administration in the Philippines promoted 
accountability and transparency, highlighting the 
importance of these in the design of the tools, platforms 
and mechanisms created in response to Typhoon Haiyan. 
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But in reality, those that were created were merely 
used for increasing transparency: there was no 
accountability framework which government agencies 
could adhere to and use as a guide to render 
themselves accountable to people during and after 
disasters. Our research observed that the tools, 
platforms and mechanisms developed, and used by 
all levels of governance in the Philippines, served as 
platforms for information dissemination, reporting 
and monitoring only; they generally lacked features 
such as evaluation of community responses, which 
would enable them to check that their services were 
appropriate, relevant, effective, timely, coordinated and 
complementary – as required by the Core Humanitarian 
Standard on Quality and Accountability (see Section 2).
National level
During the initial stages of the Typhoon Haiyan response, 
the national government struggled to come up with tools 
and platforms that would ensure the proper monitoring 
and reporting of services provided to communities. 
In the absence of such an accountability framework 
and platform, Typhoon Haiyan triggered a market for 
technology-based interventions and platforms seeking 
to operationalise accountability. While the concepts 
behind these were often good, their implementation and 
sustainability were not. This is particularly true of the 
online platforms that were created, most of which have 
already been closed (e.g. eMPATHY and FAiTH).
National agencies also designed platforms and tools 
to make local government units accountable to the 
national government for the projects they implemented 
in their localities during Typhoon Haiyan. Many 
included internal mechanisms and processes to ensure 
accountability and transparency. For example, through 
data from OpenBUB, the Deparment of Budget and 
Management could sanction local government units 
and end bottom-up budgeting support.
Tracking projects across agencies, which have different 
internal policies and focuses, became an issue for those 
managing accountability platforms. There were also 
issues with different understandings of core themes, 
because the relief and recovery projects were diverse: 
for example, they lacked a common understanding on 
what “building back better” means at the national level. 
Further, the Office of the Presiential Assistant for 
Recovery and Rehabilitation lacked the mandate to 
require national government agencies and humanitarian 
organisations to report their response interventions. 
Because of the overwhelming scale of the emergency, 
everyday government processes, such as coordination 
and reporting, were set aside – thus accountability in 
general was neglected. The national agencies involved in 
rehabilitation work that were interviewed in this research 
admitted to the lack of a standard communication process 
and protocol, which greatly hindered collaboration. 
During the response to Typhoon Haiyan, the disconnect 
between the national and local levels also became 
evident in the national-level systems created to monitor 
project implementation. Political dynamics happening 
between national and local government officials 
affected the sustainability of established accountability 
mechanisms, which was attributed to local officials 
belonging to different political parties than national 
officials. In some cases, local governments refused to 
submit their data on the platforms and opted to share 
their reports directly with the people using traditional 
tools (e.g. bulletin boards, community meetings, 
published reports). Thus, monitoring from the national 
level on interventions happening at the local level and 
assessing their accuracy through the reports became 
difficult. This also caused some budget allocation 
concerns, as some needs may have already been met 
at the local level, but local chief executives were still 
requesting additional support from national agencies.
Local level
While it is recognised that local government units 
prepared for the incoming disaster of Typhoon Haiyan 
through information dissemination and the preparation 
of relief goods and evacuation centres, its unexpected 
magnitude overwhelmed their capacities. At the same 
The previous administration in the Philippines promoted accountability and 
transparency, highlighting the importance of these in the design of the tools, 
platforms and mechanisms created in response to Typhoon Haiyan. But in 
reality, those that were created were merely used for increasing transparency: 
there was no accountability framework which government agencies could 
adhere to and use as a guide to render themselves accountable to people 
during and after disasters. 
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time, both emergency and regular staff and their 
families were themselves adversely affected by the 
typhoon. This left the emergency response mechanisms 
and the governance system in chaos, as the local 
officials did not know how to proceed after such a 
huge disaster. 
Development agencies that came to help during 
and after the disaster observed the inconsistency 
and unreliability of the local government units in 
implementing DRR programmes and projects. The 
implementation of structures and platforms at the local 
level was inconsistent and / or unreliable, for example 
with a lack of knowledge on the status of projects. 
Based on the interviews, feedback from communities 
was not usually accepted positively by staff in local 
government units.
During our research, some community members 
were critical of the local administration, saying too 
much politics is in play in the implementation of 
DRRM programmes. In resettlement programmes, 
for example, the local government unit executive 
selects the beneficiaries. People complained that 
those who are close to political leaders were the ones 
who received housing units or were prioritised in the 
selection process. Yet there is no effective mechanism 
to challenge local officials who violate procedures or 
fail to deliver promised services. While there are several 
laws concerning public officials, and cases can be filed 
against them, in most cases corruption remains at the 
level of rumour and litigation cases are rarely filed. 
Similarly, it is difficult to challenge gaps between what 
was promised and what was delivered. In a post-
disaster housing project in Leyte, for example, no 
sanctions or penalties were made against the local 
government unit even when its plans were unfulfilled, 
wholly or partially, or were changed by the duty bearers 
(Co et al. 2016).
Indeed, patronage politics plays out very strongly 
in DRRM. Those who are against local politicians 
are very vocal among themselves, and with external 
people such as researchers, but they refuse to bring 
up their grievances openly with officials. They just say 
“Wala namang mangyayari dyan, bakit pa?”, which 
means “Nothing will happen on the complaint, so why 
complain?” For poor people who feel they do not get 
the services due to them, speaking out against local 
politicians is a dangerous act, and they fear retaliation; 
they would rather be silent than face a powerful enemy. 
Non-state actors
Non-state actors such as CSOs, NGOs and private 
groups have overarching accountability responsibilities. 
These not only cover their own organisation’s 
accountability; they are also expected by communities 
to ensure the accountability of other actors, such 
as local governments. Communicating consistently 
with communities is particularly important for non-
state actors. It helps communities to understand why 
certain decisions are being made by leaders and in 
projects. It also helps them to appreciate accountability 
processes. And, because of their long presence in 
many communities – often spanning years of grass-
roots work – many non-state actors have developed 
relationships of trust with community members, which 
further renders them with the role of delivering and 
monitoring accountability.
Non-state actors’ activities relating to accountability 
include: monitoring and evaluation; response activities; 
delivering systems and mechanisms that ensure 
information and service provision; handling complaints 
and feedback mechanisms; coordination with other 
organisations that deal with assistance to affected 
populations; communication with communities; the 
submission of reports to other organisations; analysing 
community feedback; and establishing partnerships 
with other organisations and local government units.
One of the leading non-state mechanisms employed 
during and after Typhoon Haiyan was the Community 
of Practice on Community Engagement (see Section 
4.5). This has several members, including INGOs, local 
government, CSOs, NGOs, church organisations, media 
development organisations and telecommunication 
companies. The combined knowledge and experience 
brought together in this network contributed to an 
effective, coordinated communications response from 
among the members of the Community of Practice, 
and provided cultural context and connections within 
communities, on which relief efforts were able to build. 
As discussed earlier, the Community of Practice evolved 
from the Communication with Communities technical 
working group. Regular interaction and strong, 
transparent leadership in this earlier body helped 
There is no effective mechanism to challenge local officials who violate 
procedures or fail to deliver promised services. There are several laws 
concerning public officials, and cases can be filed against them, but in most cases 
corruption remains at the level of rumour and litigation cases are rarely filed. 
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to address and overcome issues of power between 
the many agencies involved. Further, it strengthened 
relationships, which made coordination easier. In 
some cases, it led to direct collaboration in community 
engagement activities.
Yet while the non-state actors involved in relief efforts 
were able to create a framework for accountability in 
their engagements, it is not always easy to navigate 
accountability issues on the ground. One of the 
crucial challenges became evident during the start of 
projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, when they 
were yet to secure the trust of the key people in some 
communities. At this stage, the willingness to listen and 
cooperate is not always present among communities. 
However, trust is usually established once the delivery 
of services becomes consistent. Other challenges 
include people’s refusal to cooperate and listen, and 
information that is difficult to verify. In these cases, 
separating ‘noise’ from real evidence is important.
There were notable challenges in ensuring that 
non-state actors were accountable to the affected 
communities in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. First, 
non-state actors usually followed their own standards 
for accountability, as part of their organisational 
mandate and policies. These are often limited to being 
accountable or reporting to their donors and funders 
on the status of the response, but not necessarily 
evaluating the quality of the services delivered. 
Second, while most organisations have created 
specific staff roles responsible for accountability in 
their programmes, such as accountability officers 
and feedback managers, these tasks are mainly for 
compliance and reporting. Lastly, since there was 
no clear accountability framework, some non-state 
actors did not directly link with the local government 
or provide information in the accountability platforms 
created, instead going directly to the communities to 
provide their services and information – despite being 
encouraged to coordinate with the government when 
providing services during disasters to prevent gaps 
and duplications. Thus, it was difficult for the local 
government and even other non-state actors to track 
who was providing what.
Community level
For affected communities, information is vital – before a 
disaster event and during the aftermath – to help them 
understand what is going on (see Box 1). Unfortunately, 
in the case of Typhoon Haiyan, while they could access 
information from various sources, they did not have the 
same opportunities to provide feedback – meaning they 
could not play their role in ensuring accountability.
People in the affected areas mostly communicate 
and access information through the television, radio 
and mobile phones. A small number have access to 
the Internet. But during the immediate post-disaster 
phase, there was no electricity and communication was 
difficult. At these times, people relied heavily on mobile 
phones to access information, as there were places 
where they could charge batteries. But while mobiles 
are effective tools for receiving information, it is difficult 
to use them for sending complaints or questions about 
the disaster response. Mobile phone numbers are not 
registered in the Philippines and there were cases 
of emergency hotlines receiving prank callers and 
threats instead of being able to address real disaster 
relief inquiries.
Active community participation was undeniably 
missing in the conceptualisation, implementation and 
monitoring of the accountability platforms developed 
in response to Typhoon Haiyan. Indeed, it is apparent 
from our research that the people affected were not 
involved in the process of planning relief programmes 
more widely, from conceptualisation to implementation. 
This helps to explain the lack of access for affected 
communties to many of the information platforms 
set up. Often, the target users for these are more 
educated people who can understand complicated 
reports, matrices and procedures, and the language 
that is often used on these portals. Yet the ultimate 
beneficiaries of information transparency should be 
the community – the people who are directly affected. 
They are not being effectively reached by these tools, 
platforms and mechanisms, nor providing feedback 
via them.
6.2 Accountability criteria in the 
tools, platforms and mechanisms 
developed
The organisations engaged in this research shared, 
through key informant interviews, how they practised 
accountability and how their organisations understood 
it to be playing out through the different tools, 
platforms and mechanisms developed. Technology 
played an important role in many of those used, 
especially in reaching out to the general public. For 
example, smart phones were not just used for sending 
short message service (SMS) messages and calls; 
they were also used as a tool for conducting surveys. 
Similarly, computers were used to establish a database 
that would record and analyse feedback.
Interviewees understood accountability to be the 
provision of information to affected communities and 
receiving feedback from them during Typhoon Haiyan, but 
Trust is usually established once the delivery of services becomes consistent. 
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not necessarily monitoring and evaluating the services 
being delivered to communities. Also, it seemed that 
there was confusion about whether these measures were 
undertaken to increase accountability and transparency. 
Most of the tools, platforms and mechanisms that 
were established before, and in response to, Typhoon 
Haiyan were primarily for information dissemination and 
communicating with different audiences, rather than 
specifically to increase accountability. 
We analysed the platforms described in Section 4 to see 
if their content observed the nine criteria of the Core 
Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability 
(see Section 1). Table 1 summarises this analysis. 
All the platforms evaluated lacked the capacity to 
assess the quality of disaster responses, particularly in 
terms of their appropriateness, relevance, effectiveness 
and timeliness (criteria 1 and 2). eMPATHY, FAiTH, 
Open Reconstruction and OpenBUB allowed relief 
organisations to submit their reports online. But 
while these platforms were designed to promote 
accountability, they functioned more as platforms 
for transparency. The information made available in 
these websites was very general and only provided 
the ‘big picture’ of the response efforts. As well as 
disseminating information, most of these tools were 
also used for monitoring and reporting purposes. 
Based on this evaluation, we also assessed other 
tools, platforms and mechanisms that were designed 
to observe accountability and transparency during 
Typhoon Haiyan such as websites, social media sites, 
face-to-face communication, mass media and targeted 
campaigns.
Communication, participation and feedback: 
organisational websites
All the organisations involved in disaster relief have 
their own websites, which are usually used to share 
information on what the organisation is about, 
the services that they offer, their programmes and 
projects, and updates on events and accomplishments. 
Government websites are also very particular about 
sharing official government reports. For instance, 
the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s 
website publishes reports on its relief efforts whenever 
there is an emergency. 
However, organisation websites are limited as an 
accountability tool during emergencies, since they 
are usually flooded with various information about 
both the emergency response and the organisation’s 
regular activities. Secondly, the information posted is 
often delayed, as most organisations have protocols 
about how to publish information and require a day 
Table 1. Evaluation of accountability platforms used during Typhoon Haiyan
Is the criterion observable in the content and design of the platform?
Criterion eMPATHY FAiTH OpenBUB Open 
Reconstruction
1. Humanitarian response is appropriate 
and relevant
No No No No
2. Humanitarian response is effective 
and timely
No No No No
3. Humanitarian response strengthens 
local capacities and avoids negative effects
No No No No
4. Humanitarian response is based on 
communication, participation and feedback
Limited, through 
email only
No Limited, through 
email only
Limited, through 
email only
5. Complaints are welcomed and 
addressed
No No No No
6. Humanitarian response is coordinated 
and complementary
No No No No
7. Humanitarian actors continuously 
learn and improve
No No No No
8. Staff are supported to do their job 
effectively, and are treated fairly and 
equitably
No No No No
9. Resources are managed and used 
responsibly for their intended purpose
Yes No Yes Yes
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or more for material to be published. Further, our 
research with communities found that they rarely 
access organisational websites or send inquiries via 
them – especially during emergencies, when they need 
real-time information.
Communication, participation and feedback: 
social media
The use of social media to disseminate information 
and promote accountability became prevalent during 
the recovery efforts after Typhoon Haiyan. Almost 
all organisations and agencies have their own social 
media accounts, particularly a Facebook page and a 
Twitter account. In interviews, key informants explained 
how they post regular updates on their interventions 
and services via their social media account, thus 
these provide more timely information than their 
websites. Even before Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippine 
government had issued specific hashtags for use 
during emergencies. In fact, an online map26 showing 
the interventions and calls for assistance was created 
during Typhoon Haiyan based on Twitter hashtags from 
across, and even outside of, the country.
Some organisational social media accounts are 
managed by Manila-based staff, however. As a result, 
issues that were happening in affected areas were 
not always highlighted. Furthermore, like websites, 
the social media accounts were used for multiple 
purposes – posting regular events and news, as well as 
interventions related to Typhoon Haiyan. This meant 
they were not a focused source of information. And 
because social media feeds occur in real time, some 
issues were overwhelmed with posts as they came 
about, while others were not covered at all. Lastly, 
social media accounts were not always a reliable 
source of information about services being delivered to 
communities, as in many places communities disagreed 
with the information in the social media posts.
Social media, if managed effectively and properly, could 
have given the communities a better opportunity to send 
feedback on the quality of the services received than the 
online platforms developed (e.g. eMPATHY, FAiTH). But 
while effective in widespread information dissemination, 
the use of social media as an accountability platform has 
limitations. For example, after Typhoon Haiyan, hashtags 
were often used improperly (despite some useful 
examples such as the online map), with people not 
coming from affected areas posting messages and using 
these hashtags to mark posts not directly relevant to the 
situation. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the 
issues raised will be addressed; the Facebook pages of 
government agencies were flooded with complaints, but 
there was either a delay in responses or an absence of 
staff to actually look at and respond to these grievances.
The question of Internet access – essential to using 
social media – also needs consideration. Even before 
Typhoon Haiyan’s first landfall, some of the provinces 
along its path had their electricity cut off, leaving 
many affected areas with no Internet connection. 
Consequently, most social media posts about the 
disaster came from relatives living elsewhere, who were 
communicating with their families in affected areas via 
mobile phones or telephone. 
Communication, participation and feedback: 
face-to-face communication
In the response to Typhoon Haiyan, face-to-face 
communication between those providing relief and 
communities happened in the following ways: (1) house 
visits or office interactions, used for requesting 
resources; (2) community consultations for receiving 
information and raising collective concerns; and 
(3) office walk-ins, used for follow-up meetings or 
confrontation when people were being ignored by other 
channels (Ong, Flores and Combinido 2015; Smith, 
Ong and Routley 2015; Hartmann, Rhoades and Santo 
2014; CDAC Network 2014a). People received direct 
information mostly from local leaders and CSOs. 
Most government agencies and some CSOs also 
provided information using bulletin boards in barangay, 
municipal or city halls. These allowed the public to read 
reports and announcements on services being provided 
during the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. Most agencies 
felt that posting reports on bulletin boards increases 
the transparency and accountability of their actions. 
But this approach is limited as bulletin boards are not 
always updated regularly and they are usually used as 
a one-way information source; very few allow people 
to give feedback. Access is also limited, as people can 
only get information when they go to the halls.
Based on the focus group discussions, communities 
prefer receiving information through these face-to-
face interactions, particularly from people in authority. 
Communities trust the information they are receiving 
when barangay leaders, municipal officials or local 
leaders are the ones providing it, for example about 
the frequency and type of services that they are 
supposed to receive. As well as direct communication 
with barangay leaders, face-to-face communication 
with family, friends and neighbours is important to 
communities (CDAC Network 2014b).
Aside from being an opportunity to actually receive a 
response, people felt they could ‘pull the heartstrings’ 
of the responders during face-to-face communication, 
and that they would be able to get more aid if 
humanitarian agency staff were able to empathise with 
them (CDAC Network 2014b). 
26  See: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/11/131108-typhoon-haiyan-philippines-crisis-mapping
24
RESEARCH REPORT Tools, platforms and mechanisms to support accountability to 
disaster-affected populations in the Philippines
Another direct form of communication used is disaster 
family access cards, which can be considered as an 
effective tool in monitoring the quality of responses. 
The Department of Social Welfare and Development 
issues these during emergencies and, during the Haiyan 
response, these were used to monitor which families 
had received emergency shelter assistance from 
the government. Having a card not only enables the 
government to monitor how many families have been 
attended to, it also allows families to ask for support if 
they have not received assistance. The cards were limited 
to monitoring the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development’s programme, though, and did not provide 
any information about the quality of the assistance people 
were receiving, just the quantity of people covered.
Face-to-face interaction was a good way to 
encourage the use of feedback mechanisms and 
provide immediate responses to complaints. Targeted 
communities, where agency workers were embedded, 
reported more frequent use of feedback mechanisms, 
as people had developed a trust in an agency. In 
turn, these embedded staff were able to manage the 
community’s fears of making complaints and clarify 
that sending feedback would not result in their future 
exclusion from interventions, but would help improve 
programme delivery (Ong et al. 2015). 
One form of face-to-face communication that was 
less popular was community consultations. Affected 
communities reported that events such as these were 
not necessarily used to the best effect, and were often 
used for one-way communication, such as informing 
people about programmes. Some also reported having 
‘consultation fatigue’, due to the large number of 
humanitarian agencies doing focus group discussions 
and consultations (Ong et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2015). 
Further to those described, Smith et al. (2015) 
identified the following channels of face-to-face 
communication as being used by humanitarian 
organisations during the response to Typhoon Haiyan 
to establish two-way communications and obtain 
feedback from affected communities: field visits 
by staff; community assemblies / consultations; 
suggestion and complaint boxes; and help desks.
Communication, participation and feedback: 
mass media
Mass media (e.g. television, radio, newspapers) remains 
one of the main sources of information for communities 
affected by disasters. Similar to other emergencies, 
radio was the preferred and most accessible media 
channel during the Haiyan response (Smith et al. 2015; 
Hartmann et al. 2014; CDAC Network 2014b). Before 
Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines, most of the people 
living along its path relied on television and radio for 
news; “radios could be used by larger groups of people 
in common spaces such as barangay halls” (CDAC 
2014a: 18). 
Several different organisations used radio broadcasts 
to convey information. The Pamati Kita campaign 
used Radio Abante, a communtiy radio provider 
which broadcast programmes about the humanitarian 
response and invited listeners to phone in and discuss 
their concerns with agency staff. It also used comics to 
inform people about the interventions (Jacobs 2015). 
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) also 
used Radio Abante to broadcast, along with several 
talk shows, the Tindog Kita radio drama. This ten-part 
radio drama, broadcast five times a week, integrated 
key information on the most pressing concerns being 
faced by families and communities – including how 
to build safer, more resilient homes, and health and 
psychological problems and protection issues – with 
psychosocial support that was achieved through 
entertainment. At the end of each episode, listeners 
were encouraged to answer questions through SMS 
and send feedback. 
Generally, people saw the campaigns as positive. 
Female community members reported learning a lot 
from the radio drama, although its link to behaviour 
change is uncertain. The interactive talk show 
encouraged listeners during a very difficult situation. 
It also enabled two-way communication, but it is 
While direct personal communication is a useful 
approach, especially at the local level, and often 
preferred by communities, there is sometimes 
a question of the quality of information being 
conveyed via local leaders. During our interviews 
with local leaders, they explained that some of the 
information they pass on is relayed from those 
higher up in terms of authority. But when services 
are not received, or not of good quality, they 
are the ones who are blamed or questioned by 
communities. 
Direct communication is not always ideal for 
humanitarian organisations either. Following an 
emergency, many experience serious limitations 
in being able to communicate with affected 
populations through labour-intensive face-to-face 
approaches (Hartmann et al. 2014). But while it 
might be time-consuming and not always cost-
effective, it is still very useful, as staff are able to 
establish a personal relationship with community 
members, making the recipients of their services 
feel more comfortable about airing their concerns. 
This approach also makes it possible for staff to 
verify the claims being made by a community (e.g. 
the status of resources).
Box 3. Challenges with face-to-
face communication
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important to note that Radio Abante, as a community 
radio, has only limited reach as compared to 
commercial radio stations. Although humanitarian radio 
broadcasts can be a key source of information and 
discussion in affected areas, their reach and resources 
are limited and thus require greater investment and 
focus in future responses (CDAC Network 2014a). 
Further, despite the popularity of some of these shows, 
communities felt that the mass media was not able 
to provide them with information as often as they 
wanted or needed. In the survey, respondents wanted 
information about relief services to be provided daily, 
but mass media during Typhoon Haiyan was only used 
intermittently to share information about relief efforts, 
with television still mostly being used for regular 
programmes. 
When considering how the various types of mass media 
could be enhanced, it is important to understand the 
information and communications problems in the areas 
struck by Typhoon Haiyan. Wigley (2015) reports 
the following issues, which could help the design of 
future communications and accountability campaigns 
immediately after disasters. 
• During the first few days after Typhoon Haiyan, 
people were cut off from their usual sources of 
information and communication, including television, 
radio and print media.
• Adults found the lack of both general news and 
specific information about the response a significant 
source of anguish.
• People highlighted the need for telephones and 
radios, and the means to recharge them, so they 
could receive information. 
Communication, participation and feedback: 
targeted campaigns
Among the many communications campaigns launched 
during the Haiyan response, two were particularly 
aimed at improving accountability to affected 
populations: the Tindog Kita (Rise Together) campaign 
by the IOM (see previous discussion), and the Pamati 
Kita (Let’s Listen Together) campaign by the IOM, 
World Vision International and Plan International. 
The idea of the Pamati Kita campaign was to provide 
common channels through which communities 
could communicate with humanitarian agencies. 
Conceptualised a month after Typhoon Haiyan struck, 
the people behind the campaign saw that agencies kept 
on setting up individual channels of communication 
with communities, resulting in the duplication of efforts 
and ‘consultation fatigue’. This proposed solution 
aimed to avoid duplication and reduce confusion 
among communities, and to encourage a coordinated 
approach to responding to community feedback 
(Jacobs 2015). 
The campaign built a common set of services offered 
jointly by the humanitarian agencies in the field, 
which included: (1) a public information campaign 
outlining the agencies’ major commitments to 
communities, together with contact details and 
actions that communities could take if the agencies 
fell short of their commitments; (2) a joint hotline that 
allowed community members to ask questions, lodge 
complaints and get answers; and (3) combined analysis 
of feedback data, to allow each agency to benefit 
from all the data generated. Undertaking a combined 
analysis of feedback data also allowed agencies to view 
the overall response and recovery programme, as well 
as compare their feedback to other agencies (Ibid.).
The agencies involved developed common feedback 
tools to get the general, broad insights from the 
communities’ feedback on the work being done. 
Short standard questions, which considered the 
Sphere Core Standards and the Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership Standards, were designed 
to generate quantitative and qualitative data. A 
common methodology for community consultations 
was also agreed, with a focus on dialogue and using a 
standardised reporting format for consistency. 
Also under this campaign, training events were held 
to build the capacity within humanitarian agencies 
in terms of accountability. These built on the IOM’s 
community response map, an online data platform 
to track and respond to community feedback. 
Documenting actions was given importance, as this 
enabled agencies to replicate best practices and 
improve on lapses (Ibid.). 
6.3 Common challenges in 
achieving accountability
Responding to complaints
As this discussion highlights, several different tools, 
platforms and mechanisms were used during Typhoon 
Haiyan to foster communication, participation and 
feedback, including complaints. Despite this, there were 
limited spaces for people to receive immediate action in 
response to their complaints. 
One joint output from the Accountability to Affected 
Populations and Communications with Communities 
technical working groups was the development of 
community feedback forms, a mechanism introduced 
to consolidate the community feedback being 
collected in different ways by various humanitarian 
agencies (CDAC Network 2014a). It was assumed that 
once this feedback was properly and systematically 
organised, it could be more effectively communicated 
to decision-makers and result in improvements to aid 
delivery and programming. It was also hoped that this 
approach would: ensure feedback was passed to the 
appropriate agency or cluster; reduce the duplication 
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of interventions and communities 
suffering from consultation fatigue; 
and promote a culture of cooperation 
and transparency among humanitarian 
agencies. Figure 4 shows how the 
process worked in affected areas of 
Tacloban. 
The community feedback forms 
provided a mechanism for 
organisations to look at how they 
were working together, share feedback 
in a more structured way, ensuring 
that the feedback had greater depth 
and greater coverage. It also meant 
feedback was shared in a less biased 
way than, for example, during cluster 
meetings when a representative of an 
organisation will share feedback in 
the absence of the concerned agency. 
The mechanism also provided an 
opportunity for humanitarian agencies 
to improve their programming 
and provide feedback to decision-
makers about what information the 
communities really needed. The 
challenge, however, was making sure 
that the feedback was accurate and 
sent back to the decision-makers, and 
that the action made was appropriate.
Achieving coordinated and 
complementary responses
All of the tools, platforms and 
mechanisms discussed were designed 
to provide information on government 
interventions and projects for 
disaster response, and to ensure that 
responses were well-coordinated and 
complementary. The reports produced 
from the platforms were supposed to 
be used by the concerned agencies 
to identify gaps and overlaps, and 
allow them to address these with 
other sectors or agencies. The challenge, however, 
was ensuring that all agencies were committed to 
submitting information about their services. Based on 
our interviews, some agencies and organisations did 
not use these platforms, preferring to either use or 
develop their own.
Effective management of resources
Humanitarian tools, platforms and mechanisms 
that were established during Typhoon Haiyan were 
designed to make sure that the public are aware of 
how resources are being managed and used. But in 
the absence of a uniform monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism for disaster response, the government 
and even non-state humanitarian actors struggle to 
manage their combined resources effectively. There are 
several challenges to making the platforms described in 
Section 4 more effective at monitoring how resources 
are being used.
Firstly, the accuracy of the data. The platforms evaluated 
relied on information coming from local governments, 
which is then submitted to provincial, regional and 
national government agencies. At the local level, there 
are no clear mechanisms to check the reliability of the 
data. The use of bulletin boards has been the traditional 
way of local governments of informing the public of how 
funds are being used, but this too is not very reliable and 
these are not always used by the public.
INFORMAL MECHANISMS 
Discussions with project stakeholders
Feedback from community leaders
Drop-in visits to UN/INGO offices
Spot checks to verify distribution of materials
Discussions with community members
Personal interviews
Interactive radio programs
After Action Review real time evaluation
FORMAL MECHANISMS 
Focus groups
Community consultations
Feedback during distributions
Post distribution monitoring reports
Hotline numbers
Needs assessments
Feedback boxes in communities
Household surveys
Agencies consolidate  
data and complete CFF  
fortnightly/monthly
Humanitarian Country TeamNational ICCM
OCHA AAP/CwC officers 
consolidate the data
Data discussed and prioritised at  
AAP/CwC working group
WG members take 
feedback and/or answers 
back to own agency 
programme teams
Agencies feed responses 
back to communities
Priorty points taken to Tacloban 
Intercluster Coordination Meeting (ICCM)
COMMUNITIES GIVE FEEDBACK TO AGENCIES
Cluster members 
take feedback and/or 
answers back to own 
agency programme 
teams
IF NECESSARY
IF URGENT
HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES
CFF
 
TACLOBAN
 
PROCESS
IF NECESSARY
Figure 4. The community feedback form (CFF) used in Tacloban
Source: Reproduced with permission from CDAC Network (2014b)
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As discussed, each agency has its own requirements 
and mechanisms for reporting how funds are being 
used. For example, the Commission on Audit releases 
an audit report on fund utilisation for all government 
agencies, including during disasters, but this is not 
real-time information. The online platforms created 
were supposed to provide such real-time information, 
but this was not possible due to delays in agencies 
completing their own internal reporting. The platforms 
could be more useful if each level of government or 
organisation managed its own page in one platform, 
using the same format. This would, for example, allow 
users to identify which local government units and 
organisations are not submitting their reports.
Lastly, humanitarian agencies have their own 
accountabilities, especially in reporting how their funds 
are used. Thus, without an agreement between the 
government and humanitarian organisations on how to 
measure and monitor accountabilities, it will be difficult 
to require all agencies to submit their reports in the 
same way or with the same regularity.
Missing accountability criteria
Using the Core Humanitarian Standards as a reference, 
six of the nine criteria were missing in the content and 
design of many of the tools, platforms and approaches 
used. Criteria 1, 2 and 6, which discuss the quality of 
the humanitarian response – which is supposed to be 
appropriate, relevant, effective, timely, coordinated and 
complementary – were not observed in any of the tools, 
platforms and mechanisms. Having online systems and 
allowing communities to be involved in humanitarian 
coordination could have helped in achieving these 
criteria, especially in monitoring the types of 
interventions being provided, if they were timely, and 
well-coordinated. Criterion 8, on support given to 
humanitarian staff from both government and non-state 
actors providing support to affected areas, was also 
missing. This could be achieved via the development of 
a database, which could help the public know and check 
if the people providing them support are legitimate. 
Furthermore, this database could enable humanitarian 
staff share feedback on their own experiences of 
working with the government, other agencies and 
communities. It is important to ensure that the actors 
themselves are protected and are well cared for.
Furthermore, continuous learning and improvement 
(criterion 7) and strengthening of local capacities 
(criterion 3) are vital to make service providers 
accountable. The platforms in the case studies have 
no space to allow users to learn from the responses 
recieved and improve their activities. It is only direct 
engagements – such as face-to-face communication 
and community feedback forms – that allow responders 
to learn from their mistakes and listen to feedback.
6.4 Accountability to non-
beneficiaries
In designing accountability tools, platforms and 
mechanisms, it is important to identify the levels 
of accountability and to whom responders are 
accountable to. Apart from the beneficiaries, a disaster 
also affects wider groups in any population. 
Most widely, it is the general public’s interest to know 
the services that are being provided to disaster-
affected areas, primarily since taxpayers’ money is 
being used to fund these. Most of the platforms were 
designed without the need to register, making them 
accessible to the general public. 
Affected non-beneficiaries – those who have been 
affected by a disaster but have not received relief 
or assistance – are an important group in any post-
disaster situation. Months after a disaster, when 
Internet connections have been restored, these 
people can access the same web-based accountability 
platforms for disaster response and rehabilitation 
as the general public. Beyond this, the mass media 
– which generally targets a wide audience – is an 
important channel for broadcasting significant 
information on projects and their status in areas 
affected by disasters. 
7. Conclusions and recommendations
During the emergency response efforts to Typhoon 
Haiyan, the government and humanitarian 
organisations made efforts to be accountable to the 
populations affected. Several tools, platforms and 
mechanisms were developed to improve accountability, 
transparency and communication with communities. 
However, no single government agency took 
responsibility for reporting on relief efforts, for example 
the overall use of funds for relief efforts. And, although 
there were systems in place, the use of these was not 
maximised, and they did not enable the main target 
users – affected communities – to view the response 
and recovery efforts as a complete picture. 
The accountability platforms evaluated in this research 
were designed to provide a way for people and 
organisations to obtain information about disaster 
response and disaster risk reduction programmes in 
general, thus enabling their users to use knowledge as 
a basis for advocacy, criticism and making proposals 
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for improvements to programmes. However, these 
platforms lacked important elements that would 
render them useful as accountability tools. The survey 
conducted showed that very few members of the 
community were aware of these platforms. Decisions 
about how to respond to these ‘voices from below’ 
and what action to take remained in the hands of 
‘power holders’, such as implementing agencies and 
government officials. For example, our research found 
no case in which the people or organisations used 
the information available from the accountability 
platforms to file legal cases to settle disputes or 
enforce decisions. Rather, there was a large number 
of criticisms about the information available, which 
expressed dissatisfaction or dissent, for example that 
there were no sanctions or penalties made for enforcing 
corrective actions – an absence of ‘teeth’.27
It is not enough to be transparent. What is crucial is 
how people can use information to make the power 
holders aware of what should be done and enforce 
actions.
7.1 Setting up an empowering 
accountability framework during 
disasters
Before Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippines had DRRM 
legislation, a designated office handling disaster 
responses through the Office of Civil Defense, and a 
council composed of government agencies mandated to 
work together before, during and after an emergency. 
These components were, however, severely put to 
the test during the disaster. What this event revealed 
was lacking was a clear-cut accountability framework 
to ensure that: (1) all actors are accountable to the 
affected population; (2) all affected populations are 
taken into account; and (3) actors who fail to deliver 
what they are mandated or have promised to do will be 
held accountable, to the people and other stakeholders. 
Smith et al. (2015) report that accountability in the 
Philippines during disasters has often been more 
apparent on paper than in practice, and that progress 
has been rather limited, focusing mostly on technical 
tools rather than the soft skills, such as listening and 
facilitation, that are essential for having a dialogue 
and changing the relationship between agencies 
and affected communities. Supporting this, our 
research highlighted the need for more interventions 
based on face-to-face communication with proper 
documentation.
Our research also showed how disempowered the 
affected communities felt, not just because of the 
tragedy that was the typhoon, but also due to the 
lack of a strong accountability mechanism that would 
enable them to communicate their needs and assert 
these. Consequently, their participation and ‘voice’ 
in the crafting of accountability tools, platforms and 
mechanisms used were minimal, if not completely 
absent. Part of this sense of being left out was 
attributed to the existing politicisation of the delivery 
of disaster response interventions. Thus, having 
clear, well-defined checks and balances as part of 
an accountability framework will hopefully protect 
communities when they express their needs and 
feedback on the services they are receiving.
7.2 Appropriateness and relevance 
of accountability tools, platforms 
and mechanisms
The government accountability and transparency 
tools, platforms and mechanisms described in this 
report displayed many shortcomings. Generally, 
the government’s mechanisms for coordination, 
monitoring and reporting were weak. The systems for 
planning, budgeting, the disbursement of funds, project 
implementation, accounting and auditing need to be 
improved and tightened to achieve sustainable and 
effective monitoring and evaluation. For example, there 
was discord in the government’s financial management 
system, which undermined the possibility of having 
an effective monitoring system to link the outcomes, 
outputs and accomplishments of each project to the 
budgets and expenditures across agencies (World 
Bank GFDRR et al. 2015). However, it is worth noting 
that many of the tools implemented were viewed as 
pilot platforms that could be improved upon over time, 
together with changes to institutional arrangements. 
The Office for the Presidential Assistant on 
Rehabilitation and Recovery should have played 
a greater role in facilitating partnerships between 
local and international stakeholders during relief and 
It is not enough to be transparent. What is crucial is how people can use 
information to make the power holders aware of what should be done and 
enforce actions. 
27  ‘Teeth’ here is shorthand for government capacity for responsiveness, following Fox (2014).
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recovery initiatives. This would have helped to ensure 
better communication and harmonised efforts between 
the implementers and the affected communities. The 
duplication of efforts and overlapping responsibilities 
could have been prevented, or reduced, through better 
coordination.
The Office could also have been given greater 
authority to respond to complex issues concerning 
rehabilitation and recovery, given its massive scope. 
Further, its participatory mechanisms on the ground 
need to be strengthened, notably through better 
avenues for community participation in the design 
and implementation of rehabilitation projects and 
programmes.
7.3 Communication, participation, 
feedback and complaints
Larger, more intensive campaigns on accountability 
to affected populations and communication with 
communities should be done in future DRR and 
response efforts, focusing not only on communities, 
but also on social mobilisation, policy advocacy 
and behaviour change. During the Typhoon Haiyan 
experience, there were many ‘small’ accountability 
campaigns by humanitarian organisations, but the 
number of these resulted in fatigue among community 
members. In the future, it would be better to have 
a unified campaign, ideally led by the government 
and supported by humanitarian organisations. 
This would also be more cost-effective for the 
organisations involved.
In terms of reaching out to communities and 
establishing two-way communication, campaigns 
should not be one-off events, but integrated into wider 
programmes, with an emphasis on the use of face-
to-face communication, integrated with with use of 
the media. 
7.4 General recommendations
Based on our research findings, we recommend that 
the Philippines creates an ‘accountability during 
disasters’ framework to allow government and 
non-government agencies to reflect on and apply 
the necessary revisions in current policies that will 
improve the delivery of their services during and 
after future disaster events. The Core Humanitarian 
Standard on Quality and Accountability and its Nine 
Commitments can be fully adopted, adapted to local 
conditions and harmonised with the current good 
governance frameworks being observed by the present 
administration. 
Such a framework will also be useful for the design 
of accountability tools and platforms that can be 
used prior to, during and after future disasters. 
It is important for the national DRRM agencies to 
involve local government units, community leaders 
and community-based DRRM organisations in the 
development of this framework, to ensure that 
communities’ voices are heard and integrated into this.
The relevance of the government’s online platforms, 
such as eMPATHY and FAiTH, during and after disaster 
events remains open to question, especially in terms of 
whether they are being used by the public as intended. 
There must be a thorough discussion among different 
stakeholders on the usefulness and sustainability of 
having online accountability tools used during disaster 
response efforts. 
While the Community Engagement Community 
of Practice offers a process for establishing and 
running such online communications platforms in the 
future, there are a number of considerations for the 
Community of Practice to manage these platforms. 
Firstly, we recommend that the government takes 
ownership of such mechanisms to ensure that both 
government and non-government humanitarian actors 
use it responsibly, and sustain it by having regulations 
for use, designated staff and sufficient funds. Secondly, 
for the Community Engagement Community of Practice 
to assist the government in the consultation, design 
and management of these platforms. 
Furthermore, we recommend that the Republic Act 
10121 is amended so that its implementing rules 
and regulations include: (1) a clear definition of what 
accountability to disaster-affected population is; 
(2) concrete mechanisms to ensure accountability 
to disaster-affected communities at various levels; 
and (3) details of who will implement the checks and 
balances of all humanitarian agencies and actors 
providing disaster relief and services to affected 
populations.
Our research also showed how disempowered the affected communities 
felt, not just because of the tragedy that was the typhoon, but also due to 
the lack of a strong accountability mechanism that would enable them to 
communicate their needs and assert these. 
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Specific recommendations are as follows.
• The National Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Council, through the Office of Civil 
Defense, should create and implement a DRRM 
and disaster response monitoring and reporting 
framework that supports and rationalises individual 
agencies’ monitoring and reporting of their 
accomplishments. According to the UNDP,28 data 
requirements requested from agencies during 
emergencies should be aligned with each agency’s 
existing monitoring and evaluation tools. Since 
many agencies have their own planning tools and 
management information systems, they took some 
persuading and orientation to adopt the eMPATHY 
data templates.
• The Council should work with the newly established 
Department of Information and Communication 
Technology to create an inter-agency disaster 
response and monitoring system that can easily 
tap into individual agency databases (e.g. the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development’s 
Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and 
Information Center). 
• The Council should consult with council members and 
humanitarian agencies to determine who should be 
responsible for the overall management and leadership 
of the Community of Practice for Community 
Engagement on the government side, and how to 
integrate accountability within all its clusters. Both the 
Council and the Community of Practice should conduct 
a nationwide orientation and consultation with local 
government units and communities on accountability 
to disaster-affected communities, as ownership of the 
system and its processes can only be established if all 
stakeholders are involved.
• The Council should review the current role of 
the Philippine Information Agency to see how it 
can better support information dissemination, 
the generation of feedback and reporting to 
communities.
• The Office of Civil Defense, with the Department of 
Information and Communication Technology, should 
map all existing and still operational technology-
based disaster relief monitoring systems and 
evaluate which can be used in case of a sudden-
onset disaster.
• It should work with the with Department of Social 
Welfare and Development and the Department of 
Interior and Local Government to map traditional 
community-based monitoring mechanisms for 
disaster relief. 
• The Open Reconstruction platform is dependent on 
the data uploaded to it by the agencies involved. 
Without consistent updates, the platform quickly 
becomes outdated. It is therefore necessary to 
ensure that all agencies and local government units 
commit to using the platform, and that the Office of 
Civil Defense processes all reconstruction requests, 
working with the National Economic Development 
Authority. This is not yet the case, because currently 
only the latter agency is processing the requests.29
• The Office of Civil Defense and the Department of 
Interior and Local Government should go back to 
the local government units, especially the local chief 
executives, to discuss the whole DRRM framework 
and how information about this should flow.
• The Office should coordinate with the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 
and humanitarian partners to set up guidelines on 
information dissemination and handling feedback 
using the different media platforms that are being 
used to share information and receive feedback (e.g. 
the use of social media to receive complaints).
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